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Abstract
This paper solves for equilibria of sequential bid (or English) auctions with
aﬃliated values when jump bidding strategies may be employed to intimidate one’s opponents. In these equilibria, jump bids serve as correlating
devices which select asymmetric bidding functions to be played subsequently. Each possibility of jump bidding provides a Pareto improvement
for the bidders from the symmetric equilibrium of a sealed bid, secondprice auction. The expanded set of equilibria can approximate either ﬁrst
or second-price outcomes and produce exactly the set of expected prices
between those two bounds. These results contrast with standard conclusions that equate English and second-price auctions.
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Introduction
. . . he bid seventy-ﬁve grand for the land when the other operators were
oﬀering bids in the low ﬁfties . . . . Naturally he got it . . . and made himself
a sweet little bundle. After he bought it, I told him he could have got it
for twenty thousand less and you know what he said? ‘I never try to buy
a property as cheap as possible. That way you’re in competition with the
other operators. They keep kicking each other up and before you know
it, you’re paying more than you intended and more than it’s worth to me,
and that’s what I oﬀer. That way you discourage the competition. It
takes the heart right out of him.
—Harry Kemelman, Wednesday the Rabbi Got Wet.
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Jump bidding is increasingly prevalent in auctions, as highlighted by the Wall
Street Journal headline, “Whopping Initial Bids Become [the] Trend of the
’90s” (Aug. 23, 1994). Two 1994 examples cited in that article are Johnson
and Johnson’s oﬀer of $35.25 per share for Neutrogena, a 70% increase over the
previous stock price, and American Home Products initial oﬀer of $95 per share
for American Cyanamid when the stock was trading at $63.
Jump bidding is a well-established phenomenon in both popular lore and
practice. J. Paul Getty is said to have used the strategy to great success in art
auctions in the 1930s. An infamous recent example occurred in 1988 when Ross
Johnson, the CEO of RJR Nabisco, made a bid of $75 for the shares of his own
company when the stock was trading at $55. In further competition, now immortalized by the book and television movie Barbarians at the Gate, Kohlberg,
Kravis and Roberts raised Johnson’s bid to $90. KKR won the bidding at a ﬁnal
price of $106 after only a few more rounds of bidding. Later, George Roberts
admitted that his company would not have competed if Johnson had started
with a higher opening bid of $90 or more.
Jump bidding has been prominent in recent governmental auctions. In the
FCC auction of the radio spectrum, “49% of all new high bids were jump bids
..., 23% of these jump bids were raises of one’s own high bids” (Cramton, 1996).
In Federal timber auctions, competitors who meet a known ﬁrst-stage qualifying
bid are then eligible to compete in second-stage bidding. In one set of recent
sales, 8% of the auctions ended after a ﬁrst-stage jump bid when others were still
eligible to bid. In these cases, one competitor bid above the qualifying standard
and then others who had qualiﬁed with a lesser bid refused to compete in the
second-stage (Baldwin, Marshall and Richard, 1997).
The standard theoretical description of public auctions relies on an “open
exit” description which does not allow for jump bidding (Milgrom and Weber
(1982), Bikhchandani and Riley (1991)). In the open exit description, the auctioneer raises the price incrementally and each participant chooses whether to
stay in or drop out of the auction irrevocably. The implication of this model is
that jump bidding need not be considered because it gives up the possibility of
winning at any intermediate price between the previous high bid and the new
one. Cramton (1994) quotes one anguished response to a jump bid, “Why would
anyone raise their own bid?”
In fact, the choice of bids may allow the bidders a valuable opportunity to
communicate within the competitive structure of an English auction. Akin to
bluﬃng in poker, a jump bid can serve the purpose of signaling an aggressive
strategy, sending the message “Don’t compete with me on this item. Beating
me in this auction will cause you to suﬀer a Winner’s Curse and lose money.”
That message discourages competition for two related reasons: it suggests that
the bidder values the good more than anyone else and furthermore, that if
the aggressive bidder drops out in favor of your later bid, his action is strong
evidence that you have overbid. Any method of calling attention to oneself, such
as raising one’s own bid, can serve to communicate one’s intentions. When the
opening bidder inﬂuences competitors to drop out quickly, he wins the auction
at a relatively low price and does not have to carry out the threat of bidding
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to a very high level. This reasoning suggests that auctioneers should maintain
strict control of the bidding sequence in order to promote competition.
Daniel and Hirshleifer (1997) study jump bids with independent private values.1 Two diﬃculties with the private value setting are that there is no fear
of the Winner’s Curse and that it remains a dominant strategy to compete up
to your true value in response to a jump bid unless there are bidding costs.
Daniel and Hirshleifer show that bidding costs lead to the existence of jump
bidding equilibria, but the expected revenue is the approximately the same as
that without jump bidding unless the costs of bidding are substantial.
This paper solves for jump bidding outcomes for the general case of aﬃliated
values to show that jump bidding has important revenue eﬀects even without
bidding costs. The assumption of aﬃliated values allows for private values and
common values as separate special cases. Aﬃliation also allows for instances in
which an auctioned object has both a private and a common value component.
The combination of common and private values creates the possibility of a Winner’s Curse in tandem with the implication (after a jump bid) that the object
is worth more to one person than to anyone else.
This paper makes several related points:
• Jump bidding can be economically rational.
The paper derives a new class of symmetric equilibria in which competitors
may jump bid in the early rounds of the auction in order to signal their desire
to win the auction. An unmatched jump bid triggers asymmetric bidding which
favors the aggressive bidder. In equilibrium, the gain from intimidating one’s
opponents at least oﬀsets the potential cost (of paying more than was necessary)
if that bid wins the auction.
• An English auction is not strategically equivalent to a second-price sealed
bid auction.
There is always some probability that a jump bid ends the auction. If so,
the winning bidder has named his price at a substantial increase above any
previous bid. Then the result resembles that of a ﬁrst-price auction. This
paper derives a continuum of symmetric equilibrium bidding outcomes, each
with some combination of ﬁrst and second-price bidding features; the greater
the importance of jump bidding, the more the outcome resembles that for a
ﬁrst-price sealed bid rule.
Several recent empirical studies of auctions use observed bidding histories to
try to assess the joint distribution for the values (or signals) of individual bidders
(e.g. Baldwin, Marshall and Richard (1997), Donald and Paarsch (1996), Haile
(1996) Laﬀont, Ossard and Vuong (1995), Laﬀont and Vuong (1996), Paarsch
1 See Daniel and Hirshleifer for a discussion of other related papers: Bhattacharyya (1988),
Fishman (1988), Hirshleifer and Png (1990). Bernhardt and Scoones (1993) study a variation
of Fishman’s model in a labor market context. Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) consider the
possibility of jumping to a focal bid, not for the purposes of signaling but because that
particular bid is especially likely to win the auction.
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(1993)); these papers primarily develop techniques for analyzing ﬁrst-price auctions). Jump bidding complicates the problem for the econometrician because
bidders may select asymmetric strategies after an unmatched jump bid; the losing bidder may drop out in equilibrium even though his value is (certain to be)
strictly larger than the current price. Thus, it may not be valid even to assume
that the ﬁnal price is an upperbound on the valuations of losing bidders.
• Jump bidding reduces the expected revenue to the seller.
With independent private observations, the revenue equivalence theorem (Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981) applies to all eﬃcient auction mechanisms. With aﬃliated private observations, Milgrom and Weber show that
the revenue ranking for symmetric equilibrium bidding for the most common
auction rules is 1. open exit auction; 2. second-price auction; 3. ﬁrst-price
auction.2 Note that the open exit auction is simply a second price auction in
which bidders gain additional information during the auction process.
The class of common value symmetric equilibria derived in this paper allows
for any revenue outcome between the bounds of open exit and ﬁrst-price auctions.3 Each opportunity to jump bid provides a Pareto improvement to the
bidders by reducing the expected price.
Another interpretation of the revenue results of this paper is that jump bidding provides the means for bidders to support implicit collusion. An unmatched
jump bid identiﬁes the likely winner of the auction and then other bidders drop
out in favor of that person; the greater the importance of the jump bidding, the
lower the expected revenue.
Kamecke (1996) argues that since jump bidding (and related strategies) can
be used for signaling purposes, dominance arguments need not select the ordinary “honest” bidding equilibrium with private values (see Campbell, 1997
for a study of cheap talk and collusion). Indeed, there is some evidence that
large ﬁrms may have used jump bids to successfully coordinate collusion in the
American FCC auctions (”Learning to Play the Game,” The Economist, 17 May
1997).
• Jump bidding causes the pricing outcome of an auction to be path dependent.
Eﬃciency results in neoclassical microeconomic analysis are usually robust to
individual actions and are not path dependent. Under the assumption of perfect
2 Maskin and Riley (1985) demonstrate that the ﬁrst-price auction may produce greater
expected revenue than a second-price auction if the bidders are risk averse.
3 Cremer and McLean (1988) and McAfee, McMillan and Reny (1989) demonstrate that
an optimal auction produces full extraction of the bidder’s surplus when the bidders’ signals
are strictly aﬃliated, producing yet greater revenue than an Open Exit equilibrium. The
mechanisms proposed in those papers rely heavily on the ability to require payments from
losing bidders. Lopomo (1995) derives a class of mechanisms which produce higher expected
revenue than an Open Exit equilibrium while guaranteeing that losing bidders do not lose
money.
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competition, the invisible hand pushes prices to the general equilibrium level
regardless of the starting point. With incomplete information, ﬁnance models
of informational trading (e.g. Glosten and Milgrom (’85)) also demonstrate that
individual events and the exact history of trades are not ultimately important in
determining prices. Subject to certain regularity conditions, the price converges
to the true value in the long-run with probability 1.
In the standard models of English auctions, the path to the current bid
has little inﬂuence on the ﬁnal price. It may be that a jump bid to a given
price obscured some information that would otherwise have been revealed, but
otherwise, the ﬁnal price is unaﬀected by bidding history. In contrast, bidding
history can completely alter the further behavior of participants in the equilibria
of this paper. As described above, Ross Johnson’s opening bid had a large eﬀect
on the ﬁnal price in the RJR Nabisco takeover. Had Johnson started with a bid
of $90, the ﬁnal price would likely have been $90 rather than $106, even though
both he and KKR were willing to bid higher than that.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a motivating numerical
example. Section 3 describes the base model of a two player, two stage English
auction: a jump bidding stage followed by an incremental bidding stage. In the
base model, the jump bid level is speciﬁed exogenously. Section 4 constructs
a class of symmetric equilibria of the two stage metagame., extends the base
model to allow for multiple jump bidding stages and proves that jump bidding
outcomes cover the range of expected revenues between ﬁrst and second-price
auctions. Section 5 considers the eﬀect of perturbations to the payoﬀs and
strategies in the game. Section 6 concludes.

2

A Motivating Example

Consider an example with two bidders, Xenia and Yakov and a single commonly
valued good. Xenia receives a private observation X = (A + B), while Yakov
receives Y = (B + C). A, B and C are independent uniform random variables
on (0, 1) and the true common value is (X +Y )/2 = (A+2B +C)/2. In terms of
the earlier examples of takeover bidding, this common value can be taken as the
incremental value to the bidders beyond the current stock price. The private
observations for bidders X and Y are connected through the common variable B
which is a component in each player’s private signal. Each observation follows
a triangular distribution on (0, 2).4 Calculations for this example are given in
the appendix.
For this example, the second-price symmetric bidding equilibrium function
is B ∗ (x) = x, producing expected revenue 5/6 = 30/36. In a ﬁrst-price auction,
the symmetric bidding equilibrium, B ∗1 (x) = 2x/3 gives expected revenue 7/9 =
28/36. Since the overall expected value is E(A + 2B + C)/2 = 1, bidders make
an expected proﬁt of 1/12 each in the 2nd price sealed bid auction and 1/9 each
4 Because of the special properties of this example, the private observations X and Y are
aﬃliated but not strictly aﬃliated, though this has little eﬀect on the results.
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Figure 1: Extensive form of motivating example.

in the ﬁrst-price auction.
In the standard open exit description of an English auction, the bidding
equilibria with two players are identical to the set of 2nd price sealed bid equilibria. Now consider the possibility of an equilibrium based on jump bidding.
Figure 1 demonstrates the extensive form for one adjusted bidding game.
In the ﬁrst-stage, the bidders are each given the option to open the auction
with a bid of 2/3, making their choices simultaneously. If only one person bids
2/3, the auction ends immediately at that price because the other will not raise
the bid. Otherwise, bidding proceeds incrementally from the current high bid
of either 2/3 or 0, and the players follow the ordinary symmetric equilibrium
based on a bidding cutoﬀ of B ∗ (x) = x. Note that this choice of bidding
outcomes for the incremental bidding stage of the game is arbitrary, but still
a Nash equilibrium of the continuation game; this section is merely concerned
with constructing a single jump bidding equilibrium which is distinct from any
of the open exit equilibria. Dropping out in the face of an opponent’s jump to
2/3 corresponds to an extreme open exit equilibrium in which one bidder always
drops out below 2/3.
There is a symmetric sequential equilibrium in which each player jumps to
the opening bid of 2/3 with any observation of 1 or greater. For an intuitive
explanation of that equilibrium, suppose that player Y uses that strategy and
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that player X receives the cutoﬀ observation of x∗ = 1. Then player X loses
the auction with probability 1 if player Y jumps the bid, demonstrating that his
observation, y ≥ 1. Similarly, player X wins the auction with probability 1 if
player Y does not jump the bid. In other words, X’s opening bid will not aﬀect
the identity of the winning bidder except in a probability zero event (when both
have private observations of exactly 1), and her choice of strategy depends only
on her expected price in the instances in which she wins the auction.
The expected price for a jump bid of 2/3 is exactly 2/3 for the instances in
which X wins the auction, for then bidding stops immediately after the jump
bid. The expected price for an opening bid of 0 when X wins the auction with a
private observation of 1 is also 2/3. Therefore, X is indiﬀerent between jumping
and not jumping at the cutoﬀ bid, while strictly preferring to jump bid with
larger observations. It is not proﬁtable to jump bid with a lower signal than
1 because then the price of 2/3 is less favorable than the average incremental
price against a bidder with a yet lower signal.
The expected revenue is 29/36 for the hybrid bidding equilibrium, which
falls exactly halfway between the expected revenues from the ordinary ﬁrst and
second-price equilibrium revenues. In general (as shown in the Appendix for this
example) the possibility of jump bidding reduces the expected revenue from an
open exit outcome, and the expected price can fall anywhere between that of a
ﬁrst-price auction and that of the open exit auction.
There are several variations of this game. Incremental bidding could continue
a bit beyond the opening jump bid when one player makes an unmatched jump
bid so that the aggressive bidder still wins the auction, but at a price greater
than 2/3. Of course, that would require higher cutoﬀs for jump bidding. Rather
than simultaneous opening bids, the seller may receive bids from one player and
then subsequently from the other. Additionally, the players may choose from a
set of more than two possible opening bids, or the jump bidding stages could
continue for several rounds. The succeeding sections of this paper endeavor to
produce a formal model that encompasses each of these possibilities for the more
general case of aﬃliated rather than common values.

3

The Base Model

Two risk neutral bidders compete in a single English auction. Each bidder receives a unidimensional private observation X̃i about the object to be auctioned.
The observations X̃1 and X̃2 are strictly aﬃliated and identically distributed.
The conditional density of X̃j given X̃i is gX̃j |X̃i (xj |xi ) over its support (0, X̄),
where X̄ > 0. Since the signals are univariate, strict aﬃliation requires simply that gX̃j |X̃i (xj |xi ) satisﬁes the strict monotone likelihood ratio property
(MLRP) with respect to xi . If xj > xj and xi > xi , then the MLRP requires
that
gX̃j |X̃i (xj |xi )

gX̃j |X̃i (xj |xi )

>

gX̃j |X̃i (xj |xi )
gX̃j |X̃i (xj |xi )

.

(1)
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The valuations of the players are assumed to be aﬃliated. That is, player i s
value is a function of the two signals Vi = v(xi , xj ), where v is continuous and
(weakly) increasing in each of its arguments. By assumption, the value function
v(xi , xj ) is the same for both players. This value function encompasses both the
private and common value cases. For the private value case, v(x, y) = x,5 while
for the common value case v(x, y) = v(y, x). If v represents a combination of
private and common value components, then one might expect that a player’s
own observation is more important to his valuation than his opponent’s observation. In this case, v(y, z) > v(z, y) for y > z (Bikhchandani and Riley (1992)),
but many other value functions are possible within the class of aﬃliated values.
Let S1 (.), S2 (.) denote the bidding limits for a two player open exit auction
as a function of each player’s information. These bidding limits are equivalent
to bids in a sealed bid second-price auction and will be used in the second-stage
of our description of an English auction. Milgrom and Weber (1982) derived the
bid functions S ∗ (x) = v(x, x) for a symmetric equilibrium.6 The base model of
the paper describes a public auction as a two stage game. In the ﬁrst-stage, the
players have a single opportunity to use their initial bids to communicate with
one another. Communication is not costless because one’s initial bid may win
the auction. In the second-stage, the players proceed as in an ordinary open
exit auction where their initial bids serve to select their subsequent bidding
strategies. A subgame perfect equilibrium of the metagame corresponds to a
sequential equilibrium of the original auction with an expanded set of strategies
(from those of an open exit auction).

3.1

Formulation of the Auction as a Metagame

The base model describes an English auction as a two stage game deﬁned by
asymmetric bidding strategies which may be played in the second-stage. Select
a pair of continuous bidding strategies (SA (x), Sa (x)) such that SA (x) > S ∗ (x),
Sa (x) < S ∗ (x) and such that S ∗ (x) − Sa (x) is increasing. Sa (x) will be the
bidding function for a “weak” bidder and SA (x) will be the bidding function for
an “aggressive” bidder in second-stage competition triggered by an unmatched
jump bid from the ﬁrst-stage.
In the ﬁrst-stage, the bidders have the choice of bids 0 and K > 0. Deﬁne
P K (x) = max(K, Sa (x)), and ﬁx an arbitrary K satisfying
EP K (xj |Xi = X̄) < ES ∗ (xj |Xi = X̄).

(2)

The choice of K to satisfy (2) implies that a bidder with an observation very
close to X̄ will be willing to open with a bid of K if that jump bid would induce
his opponent to shift from a bidding strategy of S ∗ (x) to Sa (x) Then, as shown
in Figure 2, P K (y) represents the price path triggered by a winning jump bid,
where y is the observation of the bidder who did not jump bid.
5 The
6 For

case of independent private values requires weakly aﬃliated signals.
the case of common values, Levin and Harstad (1986) proved that this is the unique
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Bid

SA(x)

S*(x)

Sa(x)
K
Z

observation

X*
cutoff for jump bid K.

Jump bidding induces price path PK(x) as
indicated by
path.
Figure 2: Symmetric equilibrium with jump bids.

In the base model, the bidders make simultaneous choices of opening bids,
each choosing between 0, an ordinary bid, and K, a jump bid. Table 1 summarizes the eﬀect of these bids on future strategies in the second-stage. The
choices (SA (x), Sa (x)) and K are ﬁxed exogenously and assumed to be common
knowledge between the players. The second-stage proceeds as an ordinary open
exit (incremental bidding) auction in which jump bidding has no desirable effect and the players use bidding cutoﬀs as given in the table. If K is bid in the
ﬁrst-stage and one player’s subsequent strategy calls for a maximum bid below
K, that player exits the auction immediately. Note that the importance of the
open exit portion of the game is determined endogenously as a function of Sa
and K. For example, if Sa is chosen to be a very passive strategy, then open
exit bidding will tend to end quickly and have little inﬂuence on the ﬁnal price.
The relationship between strategies and opening bids given in Table 1 ensures that there is an advantage to an unmatched bid of K in further bidding.7
symmetric equilibrium.
7 Hendricks and Porter (1988) demonstrate some empirical evidence that a weakly positioned competitor will bid relatively passively.
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Player 2’s Bid
K
0
(S ∗ (x), S ∗ (x)) (SA (x), Sa (x))
(Sa (x), SA (x)) (S ∗ (x), S ∗ (x))

Table 1: Bidding Functions as a Function of Opening Bids

However, the assignment of strategies in Table 1 is arbitrary.8 Since jump bidding can only be desirable if it leads to an advantage in subsequent bidding, a
forward induction argument suggests a continuation equilibrium favoring that
bidder. With the strategies as listed in Table 1, an opening bid of K communicates the intention to use the strategy of SA (x), but that action is not cheap
talk because the bid may win the auction.

3.2

Signaling and Second-Stage Bidding

The combination of strategies (SA (x) and Sa (x)) do not produce an equilibrium
for an open exit auction with symmetric bidders. There is a class of asymmetric
equilibria in the common value case (Milgrom, 1981) as described in Lemma
3.2. Outside the common value case, there are no known asymmetric equilibria
for an open exit auction with two bidders (Bikhchandani and Riley, 1992).9
The information revealed in ﬁrst-stage bidding can create an asymmetry
between the bidders, thereby justifying the choice of asymmetric strategies as
second-stage equilibria for a particular class of jump bidding strategies. Note
that the symmetric bidding strategies (S ∗ (x), S ∗ (x)) remain an equilibrium no
matter what information is revealed in ﬁrst-stage bidding.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that it is common knowledge that xi > xj . Then the
bidding strategies (SA (xi ), Sa (xj )) form an equilibrium for an open exit auction.
Proof: The player with the largest private observation wins the auction with
symmetric bidding strategies. If xi > xj then Vj = v(xj , xi ) ≤ v(xi , xi ) <
SA (xi ). Similarly, Vi = v(xi , xj ) ≥ v(xj , xj ) > Sa (xj ).
Given player i s bidding strategy SA (xi ), player j prefers to lose rather
than to win the auction since Vj < SA (xi ). Given player j  s bidding strategy
Sa (xj ), player i prefers to win rather than to lose the auction since Vi > Sa (xj ).
Therefore, the bidding strategies (SA (xi ), Sa (xj )) form an equilibrium given
8 The open exit description implicitly selects the equilibrium (S ∗ (x), S ∗ (x)) for each possible
combination of bids. Then there is no advantage to an opening bid of K and the only
equilibrium produces the standard open exit outcome.
9 Bikhchandani

and Riley show that the symmetric equilibrium is the unique equilibrium
for an open exit auction when v(x, y) > v(y, x) for x > y, which they describe as a combination
of private and common values.
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that xi > xj .
Jump bidding will identify the player with the larger signal if the players
use the same signaling strategy to determine their opening bids. Here, the term
signaling strategy denotes any strategy which calls for a jump bid for private
observations of at least a particular cutoﬀ, x∗ . With signaling strategies, a jump
bid is a credible signal of a favorable private observation. If one player opens
with a bid of K and the other opens with a bid of 0, it must be that the jump
bidder has the highest private observation (his observation must be at least x∗
and his opponent’s observation must be less than x∗ ).
Pure Private Values and Pure Common Values
The strategies SA (x) and Sa (x) take on special properties in the extreme cases
of pure private values and pure common values. With pure private values,
Sa (x) < x requires the bidder to drop out at a price below his (known) true
value. At the same time, once it is known that xi > xj , player j also knows that
he will lose the auction and expects a proﬁt of zero from any strategy. Given
any cost to continuing the bidding, any optimum strategy satisﬁes Sa (x) < K
– that is, a bidder with a signal below x∗ should drop out immediately upon
seeing an opponent’s jump bid.
In the case of pure common values, there are asymmetric bidding equilibria
of the symmetric open exit auction. It is then possible to choose pairs of strategies (SA (x), Sa (x)) which are bidding equilibria even without the information
imparted by jump bids in the ﬁrst-stage of competition.
Lemma 3.2 (Milgrom). Let f (x) be any increasing, continuous positivevalued function. Then the strategy pair (S1 (x), S2 (x)) where S1 (x) = v(x, f (x)), S2 (x) =
v(x, f −1 (x)) is an equilibrium for a second-price common value auction.
These strategies are increasing and continuous because v and f are increasing
and continuous functions. In equilibrium, bidding ties occur only for pairs
of signals (u, z) such that f (u) = z (implying f −1 (z) = u) thus satisfying
the necessary condition derived by Bikhchandani (1986): for S2 to be a best
response to S1 , S1 (x) = S2 (y) only if S2 (y) = v(x, y). More importantly, this
also implies that S1 (x) = v(x, y). Whenever the bidders tie in their bids, they
must be indiﬀerent between winning and losing after inverting their opponent’s
bidding function and then accounting for the information associated with that
bid.
There are asymmetric equilibria with the additional property that S ∗ (x) −
Sa (x) is increasing under the further assumption that X̃1 and X̃2 are (strict)
information complements with respect to Ṽ as deﬁned by Bikhchandani and
Huang (1989). That means that
∂ 2 E(V (x1 , x2 ))
> 0.
∂x1 ∂x2

(3)
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Lemma 3.3. If X1 and X2 are information complements, then there exist asymmetric equilibria (SA (x), Sa (x)) such that Sa (x) = v(x, f (x)) where f (x) < x is
an increasing function and S ∗ (x) − Sa (x) is increasing.
Proof: By the earlier lemma, each choice of f (x) produces an equilibrium.
Consider the family of functions f (x) = x/n. As n increases, Sa (x) approaches
v(x, 0) because v is continuous. Since X̃1 and X̃2 are information complements
with respect to Ṽ , v(x, x) − v(x, 0) = S ∗ (x) − v(x, 0) is increasing. Thus, for n
suﬃciently large, S ∗ (x) − Sa (x) is increasing.
When the second-stage strategies (SA (x), Sa (x)) are equilibria of the ordinary open exit auction, these strategies are fairly robust to ﬁrst-stage bidding
errors because they produce an equilibrium even without the information imparted by earlier jump bidding. See Section 5 for a full analysis of the eﬀect of
perturbations to bidding strategies and payoﬀs.

4

Symmetric Signaling Equilibria

This section proves the existence of a unique symmetric signaling equilibrium
in the basic two stage game with K, SA , and Sa ﬁxed. In this equilibrium, each
player opens with a jump bid of K iﬀ his private observation is above a given
cutoﬀ x∗ , where x∗ is determined as a function of (K, SA , Sa ).
With this symmetric jump bidding rule, the choice of second stage bid functions guarantees that the bidder with the highest private observation wins the
auction. That is, the allocation of the object is identical to that from the symmetric equilibrium of an open exit auction (or to that for any ﬁrst or second-price
auction in symmetric equilibrium), but the prices are not the same.
Figure 2 provides a preview of the properties of a symmetric equilibrium. At
the lowest values of the lower observation y, a price given by symmetric bidding,
S ∗ (y) is less than a price given by jump bidding, P K (y). Near the cutoﬀ, x∗ for
jump bidding, this inequality is reversed, as it must be, for otherwise there would
be no beneﬁt to jump bidding in equilibrium. As in the motivating example,
x∗ is chosen to equalize the gains and losses from jump bidding conditional
on receiving the signal x∗ . The ﬁrst-stage of competition acts as a mini-ﬁrstprice auction designed to distinguish situations where the bidders’ evaluations
of the object are close together from those in which they are not. When one
bidder has much more favorable information than the other, the players follow
an equilibrium that favors that participant.
Theorem 4.1. Fix a three-tuple (SA (x), Sa (x), K) satisfying (2) and such that
Sa (x) < S ∗ (x), SA (x) > S ∗ (x), and S ∗ (x) − Sa (x) is increasing in x. For this
three-tuple, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium of the metagame. In this
equilibrium the player with the highest private observation wins the auction. The
set of all possible three-tuples gives an inﬁnite set of jump bid equilibria.
Proof: By Proposition 3.1, the second-stage bidding functions are best responses given signaling strategies in the ﬁrst-stage, so it suﬃces to identify
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optimal ﬁrst-stage signaling strategies.
Suppose that player i receives the private signal x and deﬁne
φ(x, z) = E[S ∗ (xj ) − P K (xj )|xi = x, xj ≤ z].

(4)

φ(x, z) measures the expected reduction in the price conditional on an unmatched jump bid by i assuming that 1) player j uses the value z as a cutoﬀ
for jump bidding and 2) player i wins the auction if xj ≤ z, regardless of x and
player i s opening bid. These assumptions are purely for expositional purposes
- note that they contrast with the standard outcome where player 1 wins the
auction iﬀ xi > xj . When i wins the auction under these conditions a jump bid
adjusts the price from S ∗ (xj ) to P K (xj ). φ(x, z) > 0 implies that jump bidding
by i would be proﬁtable in these circumstances when i s observation is x.
The choice of Sa (x) requires that S ∗ (x) − Sa (x) is increasing, so S ∗ (x) −
K
P (x) is also increasing and continuous. Therefore, φ(x, z) is strictly increasing in both arguments by the property of strict aﬃliation between xi and xj .
Further, φ(x, x) is negative for x near zero because K > S ∗ (0) = 0 and positive
for x large since K satisﬁes (2). By the intermediate value theorem, there is a
unique value x∗ such that φ(x∗ , x∗ ) = 0.
This value x∗ provides the cutoﬀ for jump bidding in the unique symmetric
signaling equilibrium for (SA (x), Sa (x), K). Suppose that player j bids K with
signals of x∗ or above and 0 otherwise. To complete the proof, it remains to
show that player i then wishes to use the cutoﬀ of x∗ as well.
If player i receives a signal x > x∗ , φ(x, x∗ ) measures the expected reduction
in the price from a jump bid if it is known that xj < x∗ . Since x > x∗ ,
φ(x, x∗ ) > 0. Further, if i does not make a jump bid, i could lose an auction
which he was slated to win if xj > x∗ and xj < xi . Therefore, player i prefers
to open with a bid of K for x > x∗ .
Now suppose that player i receives a signal x < x∗ . If xj ≥ x∗ , then player j
bids K and wins the auction regardless of i’s bid since xj > xi . When xj < x∗ ,
i’s bid of zero implements the standard symmetric equilibrium of the open exit
auction. Then if xi > xj , player i wins the auction with either bid, but he may
also win in some cases if xi < xj and he opens with K. The change in i’s proﬁt
from a jump bid as a function of xj is then
 ∗
if xj < xi
 S (xj ) − PK (xj )
v(xi , xj ) − PK (xj ) if xi ≤ xj ≤ ȳ(xi )
H(xi , xj ) =
(5)

0
otherwise
The value ȳ(xi ) represents the maximum signal for player j such that player
i could change the outcome of the auction by jump bidding when xi < x∗ . The
value ȳ(xi ) is less than x∗ since player j makes a jump bid with a signal of at
least x∗ ; player i s choice to jump bid with xi < x∗ can only aﬀect the outcome
of the auction if player j does not jump bid.
At the lowest values of xj , player i wins with either opening bid and H(., .)
simply considers the diﬀerence in his winning price from jumping and bidding
zero. In the midrange of values for xj (up to ȳ(xi )), i wins and pays PK (xj ),
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while he would lose and net zero proﬁt from ordinary bidding. In this midrange,
xi < xj , so that the expected value is v(xi , xj ) < v(xj , xj ) = S ∗ (xj ).
Therefore, player i’s proﬁts from jump bidding for xi < x∗ are less than
φ(xi , ȳ(xi )), and φ(xi , ȳ(xi )) < 0 since xi < x∗ and ȳ(xi ) ≤ x∗ ). This demonstrates that player i prefers not to jump bid for xi < x∗ .
There may be other equilibria beyond those speciﬁed by the theorem. It may
be possible to implement a signaling strategy equilibrium for some choices of
Sa (x) where S ∗ (x) − Sa (x) is not always increasing. In addition, it is possible to
relax the assumption that Sa (x) < S ∗ (x), which assures that the weak bidding
strategy is indeed weaker than the symmetric equilibrium strategy for each
possible value of x.10 There is still a unique signaling strategy equilibrium if
Sa (x) < S ∗ (x) fails for the lowest values of x so long as equation (2) still holds.
These additional equilibria do not expand the set of expected prices for the
auction beyond those which can be produced from equilibria given by Theorem
4.1.
In many instances such as in takeover contests, jump bids will be sequential
rather than simultaneous. The simultaneous jump bidding equilibrium corresponds to an analogous sequential jump bidding equilibrium with one change.
If player 1 opens the game with a bid of 0, then player 2 has the choice of
bids 0 and K, just as in the simultaneous game. But if player 1 opens with a
jump bid to K, then player 2 must jump the bid in turn from K to v(x∗ , x∗ ) in
order to demonstrate a private observation of at least x∗ ; a bid by player 2 of
K after player 1’s jump bid is analogous to an initial bid of 0. Similarly, in the
example with Ross Johnson and KKR bidding for RJR Nabisco, KKR had to
raise Johnson’s bid from $75 to $90 (rather than just meeting the bid of $75)
to make a credible signal of its seriousness given Johnson’s previous action
Corollary 4.2. For each symmetric equilibrium of the base model (simultaneous) jump bidding game, there is an analogous equilibrium of the sequential
move game with the same cutoﬀ x∗ for jump bidding.
Proof: In the simultaneous bid game, neither player would wish to change
her opening bid after the revelation of the other player’s action. Therefore, the
simultaneity of their actions was not necessary for the derivation of the equilibrium, and the previous analysis carries over to the sequential game.

4.1

Revenue in Jump Bidding Equilibria

The most important property of jump bidding equilibria is that these equilibria
yield lower expected revenue than the symmetric equilibrium of an open exit
auction.
10 It is also possible to relax the assumption that S (x) > S ∗ (x), but this does not really
A
expand the set of outcomes since the auction price depends on Sa (x) but does not depend on
SA (x) directly.
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Theorem 4.3. The symmetric equilibrium of the metagame provides an ex-ante
Pareto improvement for the bidders over the symmetric equilibrium of an open
exit auction.
Proof: The allocation from the metagame equilibrium is the same as that
from the open exit auction in all cases and the price is identical in both cases if
the players match opening bids. Otherwise, the opening bids indicate that one
observation is above x∗ and that the other is below that cutoﬀ. Then the same
player wins in either auction, paying S ∗ (y) in the open exit auction and PK (y)
in the English auction, where y < x∗ is his opponent’s private observation.
Since the player with the higher observation wins in either auction, it is only
necessary to compare expected prices of the auctions.
The proof of the theorem demonstrates that E((S ∗ (xi )−PK (y))|xi = z, xj <
∗
x ) = 0 at z = x∗ and is positive for z > x∗ . These cover the set of instances
where there is a price diﬀerence in the two auctions so the open exit auction
has a strictly higher expected price than the metagame English auction.
Strict aﬃliation of private observations is the driving force behind the reduction in expected revenue due to jump bidding. As shown in Figure 2, a
bidder with a marginal observation of x∗ is indiﬀerent between bidding 0 and
K, for his gain in the second-stage from intimidating the opponent is negated
by his loss from jumping immediately to K. One implication of aﬃliation is
that as the private observation, xi increases from x∗ , the conditional distribution g(xj |Xi = xi ) favors values near x∗ increasingly relative to values near to
zero. Jump bidding provides the greatest advantage to the winning bidder when
the losing bidder’s private observation is close to x∗ , but less than x∗ . When a
bidder with private observation x∗ is indiﬀerent between jump bidding and not
jump bidding, bidders with observations above x∗ will strictly prefer to jump
bid because the conditional distribution puts increasing (relative) weight on observations where jump bidding is desirable. Thus, the shift in the conditional
distribution of y as x increases from x∗ explains why jump bidding is desirable
for bidders with signals above x∗ .
With independent observations, there remains a unique signaling equilibrium
with jump bids for each three-tuple (SA (x), Sa (x), K), but the expected price for
each jump bidding equilibrium would be equivalent to the expected price from
an open exit auction. That result is an immediate implication of the revenue
equivalence theorem. When the private signals are independent, the expected
revenue is the same for all rules such that the bidder with the highest signal
wins the auction in equilibrium. The following example illustrates this point.
Example 2: Suppose that Players i and j observe independent draws Xi
and Xj from a uniform distribution on (0, 1), and bid for an object with value
Xi + Xj . Then the symmetric equilibrium in an open exit auction consists of
bid functions Si (Xi ) = 2Xi ; Sj (Xj ) = 2Xj .
Take the degenerate equilibrium SA (X) = 2; Sa (X) = 0 in which one player
concedes the auction to the other to be the asymmetric equilibrium for the
second-stage of the metagame. In the second-stage equilibrium, the weak bidder
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chooses a strictly dominated strategy for the original auction: namely, to drop
out (bid zero). That strategy is not dominated in the metagame because it
is implemented only when one’s opponent will win as a matter of course, and
the jump bidding equilibrium is the unique symmetric outcome when there are
bidding costs.
For any X, E(Sj (Xj )|Xj < X) = E(2Xj |Xj < X) = X. That is, for any
choice of K < 1, the cutoﬀ for a symmetric signaling equilibrium is x∗ = K. The
players revert to symmetric bidding in the second-stage unless exactly one of
them bids K, in which case he wins the auction immediately. But then, without
jumping, the same player would win the auction at expected price E(2Xj |Xj <
K) = K. The expected price is the same in the metagame formulation as in
the open exit (or second-price sealed bid) auction, yet the bidding history and
realized prices are much diﬀerent.

4.2

The Informativeness of the Price

In the symmetric equilibria of ﬁrst and second-price auctions, prices are determined by the order statistics of the private observations. The price alone reveals
the highest observation, x(1) , in a ﬁrst-price auction and the second highest one,
x(2) , in a second-price auction. In either case, the price implies a bound for all
of the remaining observations.
As a hybrid between ﬁrst and second-price rules, the dynamic auction modelled here obscures some of the information revealed in the price for other pricing rules. When a bid of K wins the auction, that price indicates x(1) ≥ x∗ ,
x(2) ≤ x∗ and x(2) ≤ Sa−1 (K), but does not pinpoint either observation exactly.
The higher observation is the source of the price, K, but that price usually
provides only diﬀuse information about the pair of private observations because
of the pooled signaling strategies adopted by the players. On the other hand
x(1) ≥ x∗ is more informative than x(1) ≥ x(2) (as revealed in a second-price
auction) for any value of x(2) ≤ x∗ .
It is natural to associate the reduction in average price for the metagame
from the open exit auction with a loss of information as revealed by the price.
Yet, with an expanded set of strategies in the metagame, the price itself may
reveal much of the bidding history. If K < Sa (x∗ ), then a price above Sa (x∗ )
requires both players to have jumped the bid in the ﬁrst-stage, while a price below K reveals that neither player jumped. Example 2 illustrates the importance
of this eﬀect.
Example 3: Consider an example with correlated private values. Each
player takes one of the values H, M or 0 with equal probabilities for an object
at auction. The probabilities are related as shown in Table 2:
Utilizing a degenerate second-stage equilibrium, as in Example 2, there is an
equilibrium in which each bidder jumps the opening bid with a value of H but
not with M or 0. If only one player jumps, he wins the auction immediately at
the bid K, which has yet to be determined. To satisfy incentive compatibility
in the ﬁrst-stage, a player with value M must not prefer to choose K rather
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Values
H
M
0

H
2/9
1/9
0

M
1/9
1/9
1/9

0
0
1/9
2/9

Table 2: Joint Probabilities for Private Values in Example 3.
Price
H
M
K
0

Value 1
H
M
H
M ,0

Value 2
H
M
M
0

Open Exit Value 1
H
H, M
M, 0

O.E. Value 2
H
M
0

Table 3: Possible Private Values for Each Price in Example 3

than 0. With a bid of K, he wins immediately against an opponent with value
M or 0; after an opening bid of 0, he wins at price 0 with probability 1/3, and
at price M with probability 1/6 but at zero proﬁt.11 Comparing proﬁts gives
the condition K ≥ M/2 for a player with value M to prefer not to jump in the
ﬁrst-stage. At K = M/2, the metagame gives identical payoﬀs for bidders of
value M or 0 to those for the open exit auction. But a bidder of value H pays
only K = M/2 when he faces a bidder of value M in the metagame as opposed
to M in the open exit auction. His overall average winning price is M/2 + H/2
in the open exit auction and M/4 + H/2 in the metagame.
One interesting feature of the example is that the expected price is lower for
the jump bidding equilibrium than for the open exit auction and yet the jump
bidding equilibrium is strictly more informative than the open exit outcome.
The addition of the jump bid K increases the set of possible prices to four
as opposed to three in an ordinary open exit auction. As shown in Table 3,
the price for the metagame yields a ﬁner partition of states than the open exit
equilibrium.
The result of this example contrasts with the intuition that the revelation of
additional information increases the expected price (see Theorem 15 of Milgrom
and Weber (1982), which is also discussed in the Proof of Proposition 4.6 of this
paper) . That intuition is not relevant in jump bidding outcomes because the
weak bidder may choose to ignore some of the information that is realized in
equilibrium. After a successful jump bid in the example, the other bidder realizes
that (on the equilibrium path) his opponent is willing to continue bidding up to
her reservation value, H, but does not force the bidding to continue to H, the
full information competitive price (this bidder will lose the auction in any case
given that the jump bidder has a value of H). Thus, the price fails to reﬂect
11 Ties

are broken randomly.

Avery

Symmetric Signaling Equilibria

18

all of the information available to the bidders in equilibrium. Section 5 returns
to the question of whether a losing bidder’s strategy of ignoring information
revealed in prior bidding satisﬁes reﬁnements of Nash equilibrium.

4.3

A Folk Theorem for Multistage Signaling

When the players match opening bids in the ﬁrst-stage, the second stage game
is simply a symmetric open exit auction with a reduced state space for private
observations from that of the original auction. That leaves scope for further
signaling as the new game retains the structure of the original one.
There are two natural ways to extend the set of jump bidding equilibria from
a single stage of jump bidding. With ascending jump bids K1 < K2 ...Kn−1 <
Kn , the players can signal by jumping to the bid of Km in round m of jump
bidding if both players jumped to each of K1 , ..., Km−1 previously. The signaling
phase of the auction ends after the ﬁrst-stage in which at least one player does
not make a jump bid or if both players jump bid up to Kn . At that point the
players revert to the bidding strategies prescribed by Table 1 for an open exit
auction. This description corresponds to a situation in which the auctioneer
asks “Is anyone willing to bid K1 ?” and continues to ask for bids of K2 and so
on while he continues to get two positive responses.
With descending jump bids K1 > K2 ...Kn−1 > Kn , both players have the
opportunity to open with a bid of Km in round m of jump bidding if no one
has bid prior to that. The signaling phase of the auction ends with the ﬁrst
jump bid or if no one bids in any of the n possible rounds of jump bidding. This
description corresponds to a situation in which the auctioneer asks “Is anyone
willing to bid K1 ?”, and then reduces the price to K2 and beyond if no one
opens the bidding at the given price.
Theorem 4.4. There are symmetric metagame equilibria with any number of
stages of signaling based on ascending or descending jump bids. Each additional
stage of signaling reduces the average price for the general auction and provides
a Pareto improvement for the bidders.12
Proof: See Appendix.
In the limit as the number of stages of jump bidding grows large (with jump
bids spaced equidistantly between 0 and V̄ ), ascending and descending jump
bids converge respectively to open exit and Dutch auctions.13 As the distance
between jump bids becomes negligable for a long series of ascending jump bids,
the metagame approximates a second-price auction; the price is determined
by the point at which the losing bidder drops out of the jump bidding. The
winner has jumped to a higher bid, but the diﬀerence in bids at that point is
12 The Pareto improvement is strict if the additional stage is nontrivial, and weak for each
trivial stage.
13 These results are most obvious when the second-stage is degenerate so that a jump bid
ends the auction.
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inﬁnitesimal.14 Similarly, in the case of descending jump bids, the metagame
approximates a Dutch auction, with the ﬁrst bidder to jump the bid winning
the auction. The implication of these results is that jump bidding can produce
any expected revenue between that of the ﬁrst-price (Dutch) auction and the
second-price (open exit) auction.
Proposition 4.5. The equilibria of multistage games with descending signals
cover the range of expected prices between that of the ﬁrst-price auction and the
symmetric equilibrium of a second-price auction.
Proof: Fix a degenerate (or near degenerate with Sa (x) near to but not
equal to 0) second-stage equilibrium. Next, consider the triangular sequence of
descending jump bids
{V̄ /2}
{V̄ /3}, {2V̄ /3, V̄ /3}
...
{nV̄ /(n + 1)}, . . . , {nV̄ /(n + 1), (n − 1)V̄ /(n + 1), . . . V̄ /(n + 1)}.
In the limit as n → ∞, the ﬁrst and last entry in horizontal row n produce
equilibria that approach the symmetric open exit and ﬁrst-price equilibria respectively. Since each extra period of signaling reduces the expected price incrementally, this construction provides equilibria which cover the given range of
expected prices.
It remains only to establish that the ﬁrst-price and open exit auctions give
tight bounds on expected prices for multistage jump bidding games, including
games with combinations or ascending and descending jump bids. Each opportunity to signal reduces the expected price, so the open exit auction gives the
upper bound on expected price. An application of Milgrom and Weber’s comparison of general auction mechanisms demonstrates that the ﬁrst-price auction
gives a lower bound on expected price.
Proposition 4.6. Any multistage signaling equilibrium produces an expected
price between that of a ﬁrst-price and an open exit auction.
Proof: See Appendix.

4.4

Generalized One Stage Signaling

One goal of this paper is to demonstrate equilibria in sequential auctions where
the participants choose the bids endogenously. That description is appropriate
for the context of takeover bidding where there is no formal auctioneer. Suppose
that bidders are allowed to choose their opening bids from any discrete set
of options, (K1 , ..., Kn ), where Kn > Kn−1 > ... > K1 > 0. The players
14 Paradoxically, each additional opportunity to signal does reduce the price from the open
exit auction, but when the signals are inﬁnitesimally apart from one another, the overall eﬀect
remains negligible.
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are implicitly allowed to choose an initial bid of zero by submitting no bid
at all. Then there is an equilibrium of the game with a single stage of jump
bidding which is equivalent to the equilibrium of a multistage signaling game
with descending jump bids.
Theorem 4.7. Suppose that the bidders choose their opening bids endogenously
and simultaneously from a ﬁxed set of n possible bids and that they continue
according to a prespeciﬁed asymmetric equilibrium in favor of the higher bidder.
Then there is a unique symmetric signaling equilibrium, with strategies identical
to those strategies for an n-stage descending signal game with the same set of
possible jump bids.
Notice that without the restriction that the higher bidder must be favored in
subsequent bidding, this game generates all of the multistage signaling equilibria
endogenously. For example, if the only time that an asymmetric equilibrium is
implemented is if one bidder opens with K and the other bids anything else,
the equilibrium is identical to a one stage signaling game with only the jump
bid K.
Proof of Theorem: Consider the choice of the lowest possible jump bid K1
in the one stage simultaneous game. In equilibrium, the only players who will
not make at least that bid are those with the lowest signals. Suppose the cutoﬀ
for such a bid is z1 . Then the choice to bid at least K1 is governed by a comparison between the expected price imposed by bidders with private signals in
the range (0, z1 ). The expected price conditional on observation z > z1 against
bidders in that lowest range must be greater for jump bidding with z than for
bidding 0, and must be identical for the two bids with z1 . That condition is
identical to the condition for the last cutoﬀ in a descending sequence of the same
n possible jump bids. Inductive reasoning based on this reasoning proves that
the n-cutoﬀs for a symmetric equilibrium of the complicated one stage game
must be the same as the cutoﬀs of the n-stage descending bid game, thereby
producing an equilibrium.

5

Payoﬀ and Strategy Perturbations

Since the asymmetric bidding strategies for the second-stage rely heavily on the
information conveyed by the bidding in the ﬁrst-stage, it is natural to consider
the eﬀect of perturbations to the payoﬀs and strategies of the players. Throughout this section, the term “aggressive bidder” refers to a player who has made
an unmatched jump bid, and the term “weak bidder” refers to a player whose
opponent has made an unmatched jump bid.
The asymmetric bidding functions of the second-stage have the odd property
that the bidders appear to ignore the implications of their opponent’s opening
bid. When Player i bids K and Player j bids 0 in the ﬁrst-stage, these actions
reveal that xi ≥ x∗ ≥ xj . With this new information, Player i knows that his
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maximum possible expected value for the object is v(xi , x∗ ) ≤ v(xi , xi ) while
Player j recognizes that his minimum expected value is v(xj , x∗ ) ≥ v(xj , xj ).
These results still seem to suggest that Player i should reduce and Player
j increase their respective bids from the symmetric equilibrium functions for
an open exit auction. Yet, their speciﬁed bidding functions call for them to do
exactly the opposite. In the Nash equilibrium of Theorem 4.1, the second-stage
bid functions are justiﬁed by the signals associated with earlier jump bids.15
Given that play is on the equilibrium path, the players cannot increase their
proﬁts by adjusting their bids to accommodate the implication of the signals.
In equilibrium, there is a gap between the highest possible second-stage bid
for a weak bidder, Sa (x∗ ), and the lowest possible second-stage bid for a strong
bidder, SA (x∗ ). With the possibility of errors in bidding, it is natural for a weak
bidder to consider bids in the range between these two bids. If it is proﬁtable
for the weak bidder to do so, then there is a reverberating eﬀect of deviations
by the weak bidder from Sa (x). Once weak bidders bid beyond Sa (x) in the
second stage, there is less reason to jump bid in the ﬁrst-stage and a jump
bidding equilibrium may unravel.
This section returns to the base model (results for the multistage signaling
outcomes are similar) and allows separately for small costs of bidding and small
probabilities of bidding errors at either the ﬁrst or the second-stage of bidding.
An equilibrium will be called robust to a particular perturbation if the strategies
for that equilibrium remain optimal in the limit when the probability of that
perturbation is positive but arbitrarily small. A player subject to a strategy
perturbation (i.e. a “bidding error”) is assumed to follow an exogenously given
strategy without regard for whether that subsequent strategy is proﬁtable.
The conclusion of this analysis is that jump bidding equilibria are robust
to some, but not all perturbations. Bidding costs select extreme asymmetric
bidding outcomes after an unmatched jump bid, when it becomes a unique best
response for a weak bidder to drop out of bidding immediately at the price K.
Without bidding costs, jump bidding equilibria are robust to ﬁrst-stage bidding
errors but not to second-stage bidding errors. The continuation strategies are
equilibria because of the gap between the lowest possible bid for an aggressive
bidder and the highest possible bid for a weak bidder in the second-stage after
an unmatched jump bid. The inclusion of bidding errors may eliminate that gap
and rule out continuation strategies (and overall jump bid outcomes) which were
previously in equilibrium. If the continuation strategies are suﬃciently extreme,
then a bidding gap remains in the second-stage even after an erroneous ﬁrststage bid. Thus, a subclass of jump bidding equilibria are robust to ﬁrst-stage
errors. However, a second-stage bidding error eliminates any gap in bids for the
continuation strategies. Therefore, jump bidding equilibria are not robust to
second-stage bidding errors.
15 There cannot be a signaling equilibrium where the weak bidder increases her subsequent
bids in response to her opponent’s jump bid. Then, there is a disadvantage to jumping and
ﬁrst-stage signaling breaks down.
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Bidding Costs

If there is a cost for continuing in the bidding, then it is optimal for a bidder
to drop out of an open exit auction as soon as he knows that he will lose the
auction. Thus, the inclusion of even an arbitrarily small bidding cost (e.g. a
ﬂow cost per unit time in an open exit auction or a price per bid in a sequential
bid auction) selects a degenerate equilibrium in the second-stage of bidding.
In a symmetric signaling equilibrium, any unmatched jump bid must end the
auction. Under these conditions, there remains a continuum of jump bidding
equilibria selected from the previous set of equilibria.
Proposition 5.1. When the players use symmetric ﬁrst-stage signaling strategies with a cutoﬀ of x∗ in an auction with bidding costs, then any bidding strategies satisfying SA (x) > S ∗ (x∗ ) and Sa (x) < K form a second-stage equilibrium.
For each (SA (X), Sa (x), K) of this form, there is a unique symmetric signaling
equilibrium of the jump bidding game.16
The implication of bidding costs is that it is a strict best response for the
weak bidder to drop out rather than to continue bidding in the face of an unmatched jump bid. In the equilibria derived in Section 4, any bid function
which loses the auction (including Sa (x), S ∗ (x) and all bidding functions between those two) is a best response for the weak bidder in the second-stage of
the game. With a ﬁxed and positive bidding cost, therefore, Sa (x) < K remains
a best response for the weak bidder to an unmatched jump bid even when there
is a possibility of a bidding error by his rival in either stage of competition.
As the probability of a bidding error tends to zero, the bidding cost outweighs
any proﬁt from further bidding which may accrue after an error by the strong
bidder.

5.2

Bidding Errors

If there is some possibility of an error by the aggressive bidder and there are no
bidding costs, then it may be desirable for the weak bidder to compete beyond
the level indicated by the function Sa (x). The proﬁtability of further bidding
by the weak bidder turns on the context of the auction and the type of error
which is possible.
5.2.1

First-stage Bidding Errors

To isolate the eﬀect of ﬁrst-stage errors, suppose that there is a small probability
that either player always (never) jumps the bid in the ﬁrst-stage, regardless of
his private observation. By assumption, such a player still follows the prescribed
equilibrium in second-stage bidding. A bidder who deviates from the ﬁrst-stage
equilibrium is deemed to have “made an error”, since that player otherwise
follows equilibrium play.
16 Although there are many possible choices of (S (x), S (x)), all equilibria for a given K
a
A
produce the same allocation and price.
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In the common value case, ﬁrst-stage bidding errors cannot disrupt secondstage bidding if (SA (x), Sa (x) is chosen to be an asymmetric equilibrium of an
open exit auction. Then the information from ﬁrst-stage bidding is not necessary to support the combination of strategies (SA (x), Sa (x)) as an asymmetric
equilibrium.
Proposition 5.2. The symmetric signaling equilibrium is robust to ﬁrst-stage
errors for common value bidding when (SA (x), Sa (x)) is an equilibrium of an
open exit auction.
Proof: If the players match their opening bids but that bid was an error for
one player, then the outcome is the same as in the original open exit equilibrium
and neither player should deviate from S ∗ (x) in second-stage bidding. The only
exception occurs when one player makes a mistake by jumping to K with signal
x such that x < v(x, x). Such an error has no eﬀect since the ﬁnal price is K
whether that player errs or not.
Now consider the situation where player i jump bids but player j does not.
Suppose that i considers the possibility that j made a mistake and that xj > x∗ .
From i’s point of view, there is no diﬀerence between bidding up to v(xi , x∗ )
or SA (xi ) unless j made a mistake. On the equilibrium path, it is common
knowledge that xj < xi and that j will drop out at a price below v(xi , x∗ ). Then
player i wins with either cutoﬀ point. If j continues to bid beyond v(x∗ , x∗ ), i
can conclude that j erred in his original bid and in fact, xj > x∗ . Given that
information, it is rational for i to continue to bid up to SA (xi ) while anticipating
that j will continue until Sa (xj ) > v(x∗ , x∗ ).
Now consider player j’s perspective after an unmatched jump bid by i and
that j is considering the possibility that i made a mistake with the jump bid
and xi < x∗ . So, player j might consider raising the bid from Sa (xj ), perhaps to
v(xj , x∗ ), which is the minimum expected value of the object if the players are
on the equilibrium path. If i follows SA (xi ) and j wins the auction by bidding
−1
(b) and xj < Sa−1 (b). In an asymmetric
to a value b > Sa (xj ), then xi ≤ SA
equilibrium, the players are indiﬀerent between winning and losing when they
−1
(b), s−1
tie in their bids. Thus, v(SA
a (b)) = b and v(xi , xj ) < b, meaning that j
has lost money by winning the auction with a bid above Sa (xj ).
Outside of the common value case, jump bidding equilibria are robust to ﬁrststage errors so long as the asymmetric strategies to be played in the second-stage
are suﬃciently extreme. With the possibility of mistakes in ﬁrst-stage bidding, a
jump bidding equilibrium may call for a bidder with a lower private observation
to win the auction. That is not of importance in the common value case because
the object has the same value for both players. Otherwise, the object is worth
more in expectation to the bidder with the higher private observation. In order
to sustain a second-stage bidding equilibrium which may produce an ineﬃcient
allocation after a perturbation, the asymmetric bid functions must be quite
distinct from the symmetric bid functions.
Proposition 5.3. Consider a jump bidding equilibrium where SA (y) > v(x∗ , y)
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for each y and Sa (y) < v(x∗ , y) for each y and also SA (x∗ ) > Sa (X̄) and
SA (0) > Sa (x∗ ). This equilibrium is robust to ﬁrst-stage bidding errors.
Proof: Once again, if the players match their bids in the opening round, then
they follow a symmetric bidding equilibrium in the second-stage; those bidding
strategies are unaﬀected by the possibility of earlier errors.
If player i jumps the bid at the start of the game and player j does not,
then player i stands to win the auction at a price of Sa (y). Suppose that player
i considers a change in his bid from SA (xi ) given the possibility of an error by
player j in earlier bidding. When player j’s private observation is y, the value
to player i is v(xi , y) > Sa (y). Since xi > x∗ for i’s (correct) jump bid, it is
desirable for i to win the auction at the price Sa (y) even if j made an error by
not jump bidding. The assumption that Sa (X̄) < SA (x∗ ) guarantees that i will
win the auction if j’s opening bid was an error. Therefore, it remains optimal
for player i to follow SA (xi ) after an unmatched jump bid.
A similar analysis indicates that player j prefers not to win the auction after
an unmatched jump bid by i even if i’s jump bid was an error. The assumption
that SA (0) > Sa (x∗ ) guarantees that i will win the auction after an unmatched
jump bid even if i’s bid was an error. Therefore, it remains optimal for player
j to follow Sa (xj ) after an unmatched jump bid by i.

These conditions are suﬃcient but not necessary for the jump bidding equilibria to remain equilibria after ﬁrst-stage perturbations; these are the conditions such that the aggressive bidder always wins every auction proﬁtably after
a ﬁrst-stage perturbation. Note that the aggressive bidder may sometimes lose
an auction after a ﬁrst-stage bidding error by the weak bidder in the common
value equilibrium.
The proof relies on the assumption that players revert to equilibrium strategies rather than so-called “best responses” after an error. For instance, a best
response strategy would call for a player who failed to jump bid in the ﬁrststage with a private observation of X̄ to bid up to v(X̄, x∗ ) in response to an
unmatched jump bid. If bidders are restricted to such best responses after a
bidding error, then jump bidding equilibria will only be robust to ﬁrst-stage
errors if the second-stage strategies call for weakly dominated strategies satisfying VA (y) ≥ v(1, y) and Va (y) ≤ v(0, y). Under these conditions, an aggressive
bidder bids above his maximum possible value given his private observation
and a weak bidder bids below his minimum possible value given his private
observation.
5.2.2

Second-stage Bidding Errors

To isolate the eﬀect of second-stage errors, suppose that there is a small probability that either player continues in second-stage bidding up to any exogenously
given value in the range from 0 to V̄ , regardless of his private observation and
the earlier bidding.
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Proposition 5.4. Jump bidding equilibria are not robust to second-stage errors.
Proof: After an unmatched jump bid by player i, it is common knowledge
that xi ≥ x∗ and xj < x∗ since there is no possibility of a ﬁrst stage error.
Then, player j should continue bidding to at least v(xj , x∗ ) for Vj is at least
v(xj , x∗ ) > Sa (xj ) and it is possible that player i will drop out (erroneously)
prior to that price. Similarly, if the bidding continues to the price v(xi , x∗ ),
then player i should drop out. At that point, player j’s second-stage bid is out
of equilibrium, and the price is more than the maximum possible value to player
i given ﬁrst-stage bidding.

6

Conclusions

English auctions are marked by discrete increases in bids. This paper demonstrates that participants can communicate within their competitive environment
with their choice of bids, thereby coordinating their strategies to advantage.
Each bidder would prefer a situation in which only she has the ability to signal, but this paper only considers symmetric games. The construction of each
game is arbitrary in its choice of possible signals and subsequent asymmetric
bidding functions. In practice, reputational eﬀects could explain the selection
of a particular signaling game structure. As bidders grow accustomed to competing with one another, they can develop their own set of expected bidding
actions and corresponding interpretations of those bids. The parameters of the
signaling game can be taken as proxies to describe these norms for a group of
bidders.
The dynamic model of an English auction produces equilibrium outcomes
with features of ﬁrst and second-price auctions. This result stands in stark
contrast to standard theories which equate English and second price auctions.
In limiting cases, equilibria can approach the form of pure ﬁrst or second-price
auctions, and they cover exactly the range of prices between those two bounds.
Bidding outcomes have the same properties for simultaneous and sequential
games and are robust to a variety of plausible perturbations. In sum, these
results suggest that jump bids in takeover contests and elsewhere are suggestive
of keen strategies rather than irrational bravado.
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Appendix
Calculations for Example 1

In the general framework of the motivating example, there are two bidders with private observations X and Y which are the sums A + B and B + C respectively, bidding for a common
value asset worth (X + Y )/2. A, B and C are independent U (0, 1) random variables. Then
the private observations have the joint density

if x ≤ y ≤ 1
 x
(x + 1 − y)+ if x < 1 < y
f (x, y) =
(6)

2−y
if 1 ≤ x ≤ y
for x < y. The joint density is symmetric, so the density for pairs such that x ≥ y is given by
the identity f (x, y) = f (y, x). The marginal density for a single observation is

x
if x ≤ 1
f (x) =
(7)
2 − x if x > 1
The conditional distributions for private observations are shown in Figure 3.
The private observations X and Y are correlated because they have the common term B.
In the case where y2 > y1 > x2 > x1 > 1, however,
f (x1 , y1 )f (x2 , y2 ) = (2 − y2 )(2 − y1 ) = f (x2 , y1 )f (x1 , y2 ).

(8)

Since strict aﬃliation requires LHS > RHS, only weak aﬃliation holds for X and Y . For
that reason, the jump bidding equilibria for the example will not always reduce the expected
revenue as shown in Section 5 for the case of strictly aﬃliated observations.
In a sealed bid ﬁrst-price auction, the symmetric bidding equilibrium is given by B ∗1 (x) =
2x/3, while in a sealed bid second-price auction, it is given by B ∗ (x) = x. Expected revenue
for the ﬁrst-price auction is then
ER1 = 2/3E(max(X, Y )) = 2/3E(B + max(A, C)) = 2/3(1/2 + 2/3) = 28/36.

(9)

Expected revenue for the second-price auction is
ER2 = E(min(X, Y )) = E(B + min(A, C)) = (1/2 + 1/3) = 30/36.

(10)

One Stage Signaling
In the case of one stage binary signaling, the players can open with a bid of K or 0, where
K is an arbitrary known value. If one player bids K and the other bids 0, then the auction
ends immediately at the price K. The optimal cutoﬀ x∗ for jumping to K in a symmetric
equilibrium must satisfy the necessary (and suﬃcient) condition
E(Y |Y < x∗ , X = x∗ ) = K.
First consider values of K which induce
2
x∗ ) = 2y/x∗ . Then

x∗

(11)

≤ 1. The conditional distribution f (y|y <

K = E(Y |Y < x∗ , X = x∗ ) =



x∗
0

2

y ∗ 2y/x∗ dy = 2x∗ /3.

x∗ , x

=

(12)

That is, any choice K < 2/3 induces the cutoﬀ x∗ = 3K/2 ≤ 1. Note that the price
is identical to that of the symmetric second-price sealed bid auction unless one observation
is above x∗ and the other below that cutoﬀ. In the jump bid auction, the price is then K,
while in the sealed bid auction, it is the lesser of the two observations. That case occurs with
probability
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2P (X < x∗ , Y ≥ x∗ ) = 2(P (X < x∗ ) − P (X < x∗ , Y ≤ x∗ ))
 x∗
 x∗
=2
udu − 2
u(u/2 + (x∗ − u))du
0

3

= x∗ − 2x∗ /3,
4(x∗ )4 /9

yielding revenue
−
the same sets of observations is


x∗

2
0

(14)

0

2

2(x∗ )3 /3

(13)

(15)

for the jump bid auction. In contrast, the revenue for

uf (u)P (X ≥ x∗ |y = u)du

(16)
=2

 x∗
0

u2 (1 − u/2 − (x∗ − u))du
3

4

= 2x∗ − 5(x∗ /12)

(17)
(18)

in the symmetric sealed bid second-price equilibrium. Comparing these two demonstrates
4
that the signaling equilibrium gives revenue x∗ /36 less than the expected revenue of the
second-price auction for x∗ ≤ 1, or equivalently, K ≤ 2/3. In this region, the choice K = 2/3,
x∗ = 1 has the largest eﬀect, reducing the expected revenue from sealed bid second-price value
of 30/36 to 29/36.
For K > 2/3, similar calculations apply, although they are much more complicated than
2
those above. The relationship between K and x∗ is now K = 2(x∗ + x∗ − 1)/3x∗ . Expected
revenue takes the form of a ﬁfth order polynomial taking a local minimum at x∗ = 1, so that
the choice K = 2/3 does indeed produce the lowest revenue from a one stage signaling game.

7.2

Proofs for Section 4

Proof of Theorem 4.4:
Consider the cases of ascending and descending jump bids separately.

Ascending Jump Bids
Lemma 7.1. The addition of another possible stage of signaling with ascending jump bids
and Kn+1 > Kn does not aﬀect the cutoﬀs in private observations for jump bids at previous
stages.
Proof: It follows by induction from the ﬁrst-stage forward that the players will use signaling strategies at each stage, and that these are based on an increasing sequence of cutoﬀs
x∗1 , ..., x∗n . This is the appropriate order of stages for an inductive argument because then
the cutoﬀ at each stage is unaﬀected by the behavior at future stages. At the margin xn , a
further opportunity to signal has no eﬀect; if both players jump to Kn , then a player with
signal x∗n is certain to lose. Similarly, the additional round of signaling has no eﬀect on cutoﬀs
for previous stages.
Given the lemma, the existence of a unique equilibrium in the multistage game with
ascending jump bids follows from repeated iteration of Theorem 4.1 with only a single stage
of signaling. This equilibrium is easy to describe because each cutoﬀ x∗m can be calculated as
if stage m is the last stage of signaling. The earlier stages 1 through m − 1 aﬀect the cutoﬀs
for signaling in m through the manner in which they reduce the state space prior to stage m.
Therefore, it is proper to calculate the cutoﬀs in ascending order.
Descending Jump Bids
Lemma 7.2. The addition of an extra period of signaling based on descending jump bids
with Kn+1 < Kn increases previous signaling cutoﬀs x∗j and provides a Pareto improvement
for the bidders.
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Proof: Let (x∗1 , ..., x∗n ) and (x1 , ..., xn+1 ) be the signaling cutoﬀs corresponding to the set of
jump bids (K1 , ..., Kn ) and (K1 , ..., Kn+1 ) and notice that these must be strictly decreasing
sequences.
The addition of a ﬁnal signaling stage with the jump bid Kn+1 < Kn encourages bidders
to wait to jump bid at stage n, for they will now have another opportunity to distinguish
themselves from bidders with lower private signals. Speciﬁcally, it increases the expected
proﬁts for a player, say i, with signal x∗n (the cutoﬀ when the nth stage is the ﬁnal stage of
signaling) if he does not jump at stage n. If his opponent continues with the same cutoﬀs,
including x∗ (n), then i’s proﬁts from jumping to Kn are unchanged by the additional signaling
stage and then he will prefer not to jump at stage n with signal x∗n . Then the cutoﬀ must

increase to restore i’s indiﬀerence in stage n. That is, xn > x∗n , thereby increasing the proﬁts
for all those players with signals in the range between the cutoﬀs.
This adjustment has a reverberating eﬀect in previous signaling stages. A bidder with a
signal above x∗n achieves a strictly greater proﬁt by signaling in stage n then in the original
game. At the old marginal signal for stage n − 1, a bidder with signal x∗n−1 now prefers to
wait to signal in period n, for he will then achieve higher proﬁts against players with signals


between x∗n and xn than in the original signaling game. Therefore, xn−1 > x∗n and the result
follows by induction.
By backwards induction, there remains a unique symmetric signaling equilibrum for each stage
of the multistage game with descending jump bids, and thus a unique symmetric equilibrium
of the metagame with descending jump bids. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.4.
Discussion and Proof of Proposition 4.6
Let W M (x, z) denote the conditional expected price for a bidder when he receives signal
z, behaves as if he received signal x and wins the auction. M represents the ﬁxed mechanism
which determines the winner and the price he pays. Let WiM represent the partial derivative
of W with respect to its ith argument.
Lemma 7.3 (Milgrom and Weber). 17 Consider any incentive compatible mechanism in
which the bidder with the highest observation wins the auction, losing bidders receive zero
proﬁt and W2M (x, z) ≥ 0. Then the expected price in mechanism M is at least that of the
ﬁrst-price auction.
Milgrom and Weber argue that this property illustrates a general linkage principle; any
dependence of the price on information aﬃliated with the highest private observation increases
the expected price. Since the ﬁrst-price rule relies on a minimal amount of information in
setting the price as a function of the highest signal alone, it produces the least possible
expected revenue.18 With multistage signaling and two bidders, second-price competition
in the ﬁnal incremental bidding stage serves to link the price to both private observations,
thereby increasing the expected price beyond that of the ﬁrst-price rule.
Proof of Proposition 4.6: It remains only to show that each signaling mechanism satisﬁes
W22 (x, z) ≥ 0. Let P (y(1) , y(2) ) denote the equilibrium price when one bidder has observation
y(1) and the other y(2) ≤ y(1) . The ﬁrst step is to show that P (., .) is increasing in its second
argument for mechanism M .
The signaling stages of mechanism M partition the space of private observations into
intervals [0, z1 ), [z1 , z2 ), . . . , [zn , X̄]. Bidders with observations on the same interval behave
identically through the signaling stages and then compete with each other using their ordinary
second-price bidding functions in the ﬁnal stage. When the bidders’ observations fall on
diﬀerent intervals, then the one with the higher signal wins in an asymmetric equilibrium
after an unmatched jump bid.
17 This corresponds to Theorem 15 of their paper. They state a much less general result
comparing the ﬁrst and second-price auctions, but their proof suﬃces for this result.
18 Riley(1989)

oﬀers an alternate explanation of the same result.
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Now consider a bidder with signal z on the interval [zj , zj+1 ). His jump bidding actions
induce a coarser partition of [0, zj ) where a given jump separates him from an opponent
with any observation on a particular interval. On each coarse interval, the price is of form
max(Ki , Sa,i (z)), where z is his opponent’s observation, and Sa,i is the weak bidding function corresponding to jump bid Ki . By deﬁnition, P (., .) is increasing in its second argument
over each such interval, and is greater than S ∗ (.) at the left hand boundary while it is less
than S ∗ (.) at the right hand boundary. Therefore, P (., .) takes a discontinuous jump at each
boundary between coarse intervals, and it is increasing in its second argument in general.
For Player 1, W M (x, z) = E[P (x, y)|X1 = z, y < x]. Bidder 1 acts as though he has received
signal x when in fact he has received z. Since P (., .) is increasing and X1 and X2 are aﬃliated,
W M is increasing in its second argument and W2M (x, y) ≥ 0 as desired.
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Figure 3: Distributions for Private Observations.
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